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1. Introduction 
African wildlife species, such as the elephant, exhibit substantial, multiple values, 
including their importance to preservationists and significance to African economic 
welfare.  Wildlife has potential consumptive direct use values, non-consumptive direct 
use values, indirect use values, and non-use values (e.g., Barbier et al., 1990; Barnes 
1998, 2001).  In particular, African wildlife generates substantial revenues from tourism.  
However, terrestrial wildlife species also generate a social opportunity cost through their 
use of resources such as land.  Additional direct costs are associated with their 
requirements for management resources like game wardens.  Finally, wildlife generates 
negative externalities for people living near them (Bell, 1984; Wambuguh, 1998; Hoare, 
1999), via the damage associated with destruction of crops, property, and human life 
(Swanson, 1994; Sutton, 1998). 
Realistic economic models of wildlife management require accurate measurement of 
both the magnitude and distribution of costs, particularly those incurred by farmers who 
share their environment with the wildlife.  However, a challenge to the incorporation of 
these costs into management models is the difficulty of their measurement. Most work to 
date has involved qualitative descriptions of wildlife-human conflict (e.g., Kiiru, 1995; 
Ngure, 1995).  In some cases, farmers have been interviewed systematically regarding the 
damages incurred (e.g., Wambuguh, 1998; Bandara & Tisdell, 2002).  However, farmers 
may not keep accurate damage records, recall may be imperfect, and farmers have an 
incentive to overestimate damage costs to increase the aid received (Kangwana, 1996; 
Hoare, 1999; Bandara & Tisdell, 2002).     
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Some ecologists have attempted direct, physical measurement of damages by placing 
someone proximate to the place and time of the attack to estimate the damage to crops or 
structures (e.g., O’Connell, 1995a&b; Hoare, 1999).  A financial value is then placed on 
the damaged goods.  With this method, the researcher does not have to rely on the 
farmer’s word.  However, this approach is expensive and significant subjectivity is 
involved.  Accurately determining the value of crops destroyed requires divining what the 
harvest output would have been without the attack, where and when the crops would have 
been sold, the quality of the produce, and the price that would have been received.  As 
this information is difficult to come by, damages are frequently assessed by assigning 
retail market prices to average yields (e.g., O’Connell, 1995a&b), a very crude approach. 
The direct measurement of damages also overlooks the indirect costs of living with 
wildlife (Sutton, 2001), which may be higher than the direct costs.  The indirect costs 
include the opportunity cost of growing less valuable crops because they are less 
attractive to wildlife and planting smaller areas that are easier to guard, and the 
psychological cost of threats to humans from fearsome species.   
Finally, the direct measurement of damages, as typically applied (e.g., Hoare, 1999), 
suffers from sample selection bias.  The data include only those households that actually 
report wildlife damage.  Farmers who employ illegal deterrent methods, such as shooting 
at wildlife, are less likely to report damage incidents.  Small-scale farmers may also be 
generally less likely to contact authorities; Wambuguh (1998) found that only 30% of 
such victims report their incidents.  Because random sampling methods are not typically 
employed for the direct physical measurement approach, conclusions from studies 
employing it cannot be generalized across either human or wildlife populations.     
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This paper develops a new approach to measuring the costs to farmers of living with 
wildlife by assessing farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for technologies that prevent 
wildlife damage.  This WTP to avoid damage from an externality is, by definition, the 
damage cost from the externality (Freeman, 1993).  By focusing on the WTP to avoid 
damage, we can utilize the contingent valuation method (CVM) to obtain a damage 
measure that does not suffer from the problems that plague the direct physical 
measurement approach.  CVM has been used in numerous studies to elicit the viewing 
value of wildlife from western tourists (e.g., Brown and Henry, 1993; Stoltz, 1997; Krug, 
1998). We believe this is the first application of CVM to measure externality costs to 
local people who live with wildlife in developing countries. The information elicited 
directly measures the shadow costs of the wildlife problem households seek to avoid. The 
approach allows for the accurate measurement of both the direct and indirect costs in a 
relatively quick and cost-effective way.  By using a random sample, problems of sample 
selection bias are avoided and the results can be aggregated for a region.  By focusing on 
farmers’ payments for a private good to reduce their externality costs, the incentive 
problems that plague the physical measurement approach are reduced.  
We also ask WTP questions in two “currencies,” money and bags of maize, that are 
analyzed jointly in a utility-theoretic framework.  The use of two currencies has 
important advantages over standard applications of CVM, particularly in developing 
countries.  Since many rural households are cash-constrained, the concept of exchanging 
a household staple such as maize to acquire goods should offer them a more realistic 
choice.  Asking WTP in multiple currencies also provides more information about 
household preferences.  Use of the dual CVM responses to estimate WTP also provides a     
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third payoff, which is an estimate of the monetary value of the non-monetary currency—
in our case, the household shadow value of maize. Because the shadow values are 
random variables whose standard errors are estimated, this allows us to test whether 
shadow values differ significantly from market prices. Household shadow values of 
staple goods may differ substantially from their market prices due to imperfect or missing 
markets
1 and our approach provides a new way of assessing household shadow values.   
2. The Study Setting 
The damage assessment approach is conducted for farm households in the eastern 
Caprivi Region of Namibia (Sutton, 2001).  The Caprivi Region (see map) is blessed with 
an abundance and diversity of wildlife and is one of the few places in Namibia where 
significant numbers of large mammals roam freely outside the confines of parks or game 
ranches (Rodwell et al., 1995).  It is also home to a rapidly growing human population 
that exploits natural resources for subsistence and economic development (Mendelsohn 
and Roberts, 1997).  The combination of these factors has resulted in considerable 
conflict between Caprivi farmers and the local wildlife (O’Connell, 1995a&b). 
The household survey conducted for this assessment used a random sample stratified 
by agro-ecological zones and villages (Directorate of Planning, 1999).  Two villages were 
randomly selected in each of three zones and 30 households were randomly selected in 
each village (except for one village where all 20 households were interviewed).  The six 
villages represent the diversity of agricultural practices, ethnicities, market conditions and 
                                                 
1 This is one of the significant criticisms of the direct physical measurement approach to assessing 
wildlife damage, as noted above.     
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environmental characteristics found in Caprivi, and also demonstrate a continuum of 
severity of conflict with wildlife.  A total of 165 households completed the survey. 
The survey asked households their WTP for a deterrent to wildlife attacks—
specifically, an electric fence.  This is a familiar technology, since electric fences have 
been used on an experimental basis in the Caprivi Region to protect villages and crops 
from wildlife (O’Connell, 1995a).  Visual aids were also used to illustrate the concept.  
Though the study began with a focus on elephants, it was soon realized that an electric 
fence would also be effective against other wildlife types and domestic livestock.  By 
including those species as well as the elephant in the CVM survey, the study controls for 
their effects on WTP and also generates estimates of their individual shadow costs to 
farmers.  Animal species were divided into four groups: elephants, other wild herbivores, 
wild predators and livestock. Elephants pose unique management problems and were 
identified in other studies (e.g., von Rohr, 1997) and our own prior interviews with 
farmers and wildlife management specialists as the species causing the most problems.  
As described in the survey, the hypothetical electric fencing surrounds both the 
household’s fields and its livestock corral.  Thus, it protects crops from being eaten or 
trampled and protects livestock from being killed in the corral.  It was made explicit to 
respondents their household alone would own the fence and that the household would be 
required to pay for it every year, in either money or maize.  The fence is therefore a 
private good, characterized by individual property rights and the excludability of other     
 6
users. The level of investment in the fence enters into the choice problem of the 
concerned household alone (though the government may subsidize the cost).
2   
The characteristics of the fence deterrent, e.g., cost and the proportion of wildlife 
attacks deterred for each wildlife type, were varied randomly across households. It is 
realistic to assume that different types of fences protect differentially against different 
types of wildlife and that success is related to cost.  By varying these characteristics 
randomly across the sample, we can identify the WTP to reduce attacks by each wildlife 
type.   
After the fence deterrent had been described in detail, including the proportion of 
attacks prevented and its cost, the respondent (typically the head of household) was asked 
whether he or she would be willing to pay a specified amount (the “bid”) every year for a 
permanent reduction in attacks.  Two sets of questions were asked: one for WTP money, 
with no payment of maize, and a second set for WTP in bags of maize, with no money 
payment.  For each, a “two-and-a-half” bounded format was used (e.g., Cooper et al., 
2002). This is an extension of the standard double-bounded, referendum-style format to 
include an additional question for those who answer “no” to both the initial and follow-up 
WTP questions.  The advantages of the referendum format are well known and include 
ease of use and minimal information demands on respondents (Mitchell and Carson, 
                                                 
2 There is therefore no possibility of a “warm glow” effect whereby a household can express a WTP 
for another household’s fence.     
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1989).
3  The use of a follow-up question can improve estimation efficiency (Hanemann et 
al., 1991).  It is generally accepted that WTP, rather than willingness to accept (WTA), is 
the correct measure of the value of a private or public good that is not currently owned by 
the respondent, as is the case here (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Freeman, 1993). 
3. The Village Household Model 
The WTP equations for both cash and maize payment are based on a farm-household 
behavioral model developed to describe decision-making by Caprivi households (Singh et 
al., 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995).  This approach allows 
for the definition of both WTP measures in a manner that is internally consistent and 
grounded in utility theory.  The model is simplified to focus on the two constraints related 
to the two WTP values elicited by the questionnaire: money and maize.  The questions 
were framed in the temporal context of the households having just completed their prior 
season’s harvest.  Thus, their production and total maize availability is predetermined. 
The farm-household’s problem becomes one of allocating their fixed money budget 
M and fixed maize stock S to maximize utility.  This is achieved by purchasing a vector 
of m market goods x with money prices p, and by using maize for n non-market activities 
c, including household consumption, barter, and livestock feed.  Use of grain also has a 
“price” or unit cost of consumption t that reflects wastage or spillage in converting units 
of stock to units of consumption of grain.  This is not a market price, but can be thought 
                                                 
3 A survey question posed to both respondents and enumerators rated the comprehension of 
respondents.  The results were that over 85% of respondents understood the CVM section “very well”, and 
even better than the non-CVM parts of the survey.  This was apparently due in large part to the use of 
visual aids (see Sutton, 2001).     
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of as a technical conversion coefficient. It would be 1.0 if no wastage occurs and higher if 
some does occur.  The household maximizes its utility given socio-economic 
characteristics of the household z and the vector of fixed levels of government-sponsored 
programs to deter wildlife attacks g.  The household faces strictly binding constraints on 
its money budget M = px and on its stock of maize S = tc.
4  The household’s primal 
problem then leads to the indirect utility function V(p,t,g,z,M,S), defined as 
}, S { } M { ) , ; , ( u max ) S , M , , , , ( V
,
tc px z g c x z g t p
c x
− µ + − λ + ≡  (1) 
where u(x,c;g,z) is the household’s direct utility function.  The standard properties of 
indirect utility functions hold for V(·) in (1).  In addition, it is decreasing in t and 
increasing in S.  The money and grain budgets have been normalized by deflators 
δ
M(p,M) and δ
S(t,S), each homogeneous of degree 1 in its arguments, to maintain 
homogeneity of degree zero of the indirect utility function in the arguments of each 
constraint (i.e., (t,S) and (p,M)). 
The interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers is straightforward.  From the Envelope 
Theorem applied to (1), the marginal utility of money is VM ≡  ∂ V(·)/∂ M = λ , and the 
marginal utility of maize stock is VS ≡  ∂ V(·)/∂ S = µ .  The ratio of these multipliers (µ /λ ) 
gives the shadow value of maize in units of dollars per kilo. 
The first order conditions for market goods imply 
                                                 
4 Note that the problem could also involve purchases of maize.  However, this possibility will be 
suppressed for added simplicity, and because households would not typically purchase maize and then turn 
around and use it for barter, which is the consumptive use addressed here.     
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ui/λ  = pi,    for i = 1,...,m, 
where ui ≡  ∂ u/∂ xi.  This is the standard result that the household’s optimal level of 
market good purchases is reached by equating the marginal value of consuming a market 
good (ui/λ ) with its money price pi.  The units are monetary.  The problem also generates 
first order conditions for the consumption of maize for non-market activities, which 
imply 
uj/µ  = tj,    for j = 1,...,n, 
where uj ≡  ∂ u/∂ cj.  This result says that the household’s optimal level of non-market 
good consumption is reached by equating the marginal value of using maize for 
consumption (uj/µ ) with the cost of this use.  In this case, the units are physical (e.g., 
kilos of maize). 
Defining the function υ (⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ), where 
υ (⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ) ≡  µ /λ  = VS/VM  (2) 
represents the shadow value of maize, the results of Larson and Shaikh (2001) and 
Larson (2002) can be used to identify arguments of υ (⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ).  They show that the normalized 
shadow value is homogeneous of degree zero in (p,M), (t,S), and (p,t,S,M), a 
specification that is satisfied if υ (⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ) is a function of household characteristics z and 
independent of the budget arguments.  Specifying the maize shadow value this way, as 
υ (z), one can rewrite the problem in (1) as 
}. ) ( ) S ) ( M {( ) , ; , ( u max ) S , M , , , , ( V
,
tc z px z z g c x z g t p
c x
⋅ υ − − ⋅ υ + λ + ≡  (3)     
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This equivalent representation of the two-constraint household choice problem can be 
interpreted as a single-constraint problem where the resource constraint is “full” budget 
M + υ (z)·S, against which money expenditures px and grain expenditures monetized by 
the shadow value of maize, υ (z)·tc, are made.  Problem (3) suggests that the household’s 
indirect utility function has the form 
V(p,t,g,z,M,S) ≡  V(p,υ (z)·t,g,z,M + υ (z)·S), (4) 
which is a function of money prices p, monetized maize prices υ (z)·t, and full budget 
M + υ (z)·S (as well as the deterrent program g and household characteristics z).  Larson 
and Shaikh showed that the full budget, monetized prices formulation in (4) is consistent 
with the hypothesis that both constraints bind.  Also, it is straightforward to see that in 
(4), VS/VM=υ (z); that is, the functional form in (4) is consistent with the definition of the 
maize shadow value in (2).  This relationship is used to develop WTP measures based on 
both money and maize currencies. 
4. Willingness to Pay Measures 
The indirect utility function V(·) defined in equation (4) can be used to derive two 
compensating variation measures of the household’s WTP, in money and in maize, in a 
manner consistent with the household’s utility-maximizing behavior. The parameter 
change represents the implementation of the government-sponsored deterrent program, 
from g
0 to g
1.  The WTP in money (wtp
M) is determined by the change in the money 
budget necessary to maintain the household at the same level of utility after the deterrent 




M) + υ (z)·S) ≡  V 
0, (5) 
where V 
0 is the initial level of utility.  Since indirect utility is monotonically 
increasing in the full budget argument M + υ (z)·S, it can be inverted with respect to this 
argument (see Larson et al., 2004) to obtain 
(M – wtp
M) + υ (z)·S = f(p,υ (z)·t,g
1,z,V 
0), (6) 
which can be solved for money WTP explicitly, resulting in 
wtp
M = (M + υ (z)·S) – f(p,υ (z)·t,g
1,z,V 
0). (7) 
The WTP for the deterrent program in terms of maize stocks (wtp
S) is derived in a 
similar manner.  It is defined by 
V(p,υ (z)·t,g
1,z, M + υ (z)·(S–wtp
S)) ≡  V 
0. (8) 
Since maize stocks are part of the same full budget argument as money budget, (8) 
can also be inverted with respect to this argument to obtain 
M + υ (z)·(S–wtp
S) = f(p,υ (z)·t,g
1,z,V 
0), (9) 
which can be solved for maize WTP explicitly as 
wtp
S = S + (1/υ (z))·[(M – f(p,υ (z)·t,g
1,z,V 
0)]. (10) 
It should be noted that both (7) and (10) provide measures of households’ WTP for 
discrete—rather than marginal—changes in the level of government-sponsored deterrent 
programs g.  This is more realistic because government programs are typically 
implemented to effect substantial changes, such as a 50% reduction in animal attacks, 
which is the context in which the contingent valuation survey questions were posed.     
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To examine the relationship between the two WTP measures, observe that equations 
(6) and (9) have the same right-hand side, f(p,υ (z)·t,g
1,z,V 
0).  As a result, equating the 
left-hand sides of each, 
(M – wtp
M) + υ (z)·S = M + υ (z)·(S–wtp
S), 
and simplifying shows that 
wtp
M = υ (z)·wtp
S. (11) 
Thus, a household’s WTP in money and its WTP in maize for the government-
sponsored deterrent program (g) are related by υ (z), the shadow value of maize.  This is 
intuitive, as υ (z) converts a household’s WTP maize into monetary units according to the 
internal value that the household places on a physical unit of maize.  
To summarize, by beginning with a behavioral model of farm-household choice with 
two constraints—one on money budget and one on maize stock—and exploiting the 
structure of the problem, the following three estimates have been derived in a 
theoretically rigorous and internally consistent manner: 1) WTP money; 2) WTP maize; 
and 3) the monetary equivalent of maize to the household. Econometric estimates of the 
shadow values of maize are produced as part of the likelihood maximization 
corresponding to the household’s choice of fence deterrent.  These estimates allow for the 
testing of whether the shadow value of maize is significantly different from the prevailing 
market price.  This provides a gauge for the existence of a well-functioning maize 
market, as well as an indication of the bias that would be incurred from using market 
prices to approximate the shadow price values, as is commonly done (e.g., Shyamsundar 
and Kramer, 1996).      
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5. Econometric Model 
To develop an econometric model, functional forms for the WTP functions, the 
shadow value of maize, and the error distribution must be chosen.  The household’s true 
valuation in money terms is denoted wtp
M.  It is composed of a systematic component 
h(Xγγγγ ), where X is the matrix of explanatory variables that influence the value the 
household places on the deterrent program and γγγγ  is a conformable parameter vector.  
Added to this is an unobservable random component ε
m that encompasses the 
determinants of the household’s value for the program that cannot be measured by the 
researcher.  It is assumed that WTP in money has a lognormal distribution because the 
program being evaluated is a good and therefore households should only place a positive 
value on it.  It can therefore be specified as  
ln(wtp




m is a scale factor used to transform the error term into a standard normal 
random variable, and ε
m is therefore marginally distributed N(0,1). 
Similarly, the household’s true valuation for the deterrent program being evaluated in 
maize terms is denoted wtp
S.  It is composed of the same systematic component h(Xγγγγ ), 
and an unobservable random component ε
s.  For the relationship between WTP money 
and WTP maize in (11) to hold, it must be the case that 
ln(wtp
S) = ln(wtp
M) – ln[υ (z)], 
so that from (12), it is apparent that 
ln(wtp
S) = ln[h(Xγγγγ )] – ln[υ (z)] + σ
s⋅ε
s, (13)     
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where σ
s is a scale factor and ε
s is marginally distributed N(0,1).  The separate error 
ε
s is used to reflect the fact that there may be some sources of error specific to the maize 
question.  In any event, as it includes ε
m, it is likely to be correlated with ε
m. 
The Generalized Leontief functional form was selected to represent the systematic 
component h(Xγγγγ ) of WTP, resulting in the expression 
[] ∑ ∑
≠ = =
− γ + − γ =
4






















i ik x ) g ( ) g ( 2 ⋅ − γ + ∑
=
, 
where gi represents the effectiveness of (number of animals repelled by) deterrents 
against one of the four animal threat types i either before (g
0) or after (g
1) the 
implementation of the government-sponsored program, while gj represents the level of 
effectiveness against one of the other animal types.  The γ ii are therefore the parameters to 
be estimated for the own-effects of a deterrent type on WTP, while the γ ij are estimated 
parameters on the cross effects between animal types deterred.  The xk represent all other 
explanatory variables that might explain a household’s WTP for a deterrent program, 
such as the size of its fields or cattle herd.  These are also interacted with each of the four 
types of deterrent effectiveness gi, and the resulting parameters represented by γ ik. 
Only the change in the effectiveness of the government program in deterring each of 
the four types of animal attack also appears as a separate explanatory variable.  All other 
regressors appear only as cross effects with the change in the deterrent program.  In 
addition, the model does not contain an intercept.  Each of these features is somewhat     
 15
unique in WTP models. They are incorporated because the good being valued is private.  
We assume that WTP would be zero if the respondent household did not expect to benefit 
from the deterrent program.  The functional form specified in (14) also conforms to the 
requirements of (4), is fairly flexible, and allows for curvature in the relationships 
between explanatory variables and WTP. 
The general form of the shadow value of maize υ (z) was a linear function  
υ (z) = Yββββ , (15) 
where Y is the matrix of household characteristics thought to influence the 
household’s shadow value for maize and ββββ  is a conformable vector of parameters. 
Although money and maize bids were each varied randomly across the sample, one 
would expect the household’s true WTP in the two numeraires to be related. Estimating a 
model based on the joint distribution of the two amounts allows for more efficient use of 
the available information.  A bivariate probit model was estimated in which ε
m and ε
s are 
jointly distributed N(0,0,1,1,ρ ), where ρ  is the covariance between the two error terms. 
Because the response format was two-and-a-half bounded, a total of five intervals of 
WTP are defined for both money and maize: yes to both the first money bid M1 and to the 
higher follow-up MH; yes and no to the initial and follow-up; no to M1 and no to the (in 
this case, lower) follow-up question ML; no to both the initial and follow-up lower bids, 
and yes to the minimal WTP question M3; and no to all 3 questions.  Using, for a 
moment, the marginal (normal) distribution for money WTP to illustrate, the probability 
of a person saying “yes” to the first bid, M1, and “no” to the second bid, MH, is     
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Prob{M1 < wtp
M < MH} = Prob{M1 < ln[h(Xγγγγ )] + σ
m⋅ε
m < MH} 
 = Prob{[M1 – ln[h(Xγγγγ )]]/ σ
m < ε
m < [MH – ln[h(Xγγγγ )]]/ σ
m} 
 = Φ ([MH – ln[h(Xγγγγ )]]/ σ
m) – Φ ([M1 – ln[h(Xγγγγ )]]/ σ
m), 
where Φ (⋅ ) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal 
variate.  Extending this to the case of correlated responses for both money and maize 
WTP, where maize bids are represented by “S”, the probability of a person saying “yes-
no” to the money question and “no-no-yes” to the maize question is 
Prob{M1 < wtp
M < MH,  S3 < wtp
S < SL }  (16) 
= Prob{[M1– ln[h(Xγγγγ )]]/σ
m < ε
m < [MH – ln[h(Xγγγγ )]]/σ
m,  
[S3 – ln[h(Xγγγγ )] – ln[υ (z)]]/σ
s < ε
s < [SH – ln[h(Xγγγγ )] – ln[υ (z)]]/σ
s } 
= Φ 2(MH, SL, ρ ) – Φ 2(M1, SL, ρ ) – Φ 2(MH, S3, ρ ) + Φ 2(M1, S3, ρ ) 
where Φ 2(⋅ ,⋅ ,ρ ) is the bivariate probit cdf, and the arguments Mj and Sk in (16) refer to 
the bids offered to the individual.  Indexing the set of all 25 possible response patterns (5 
intervals each for the two WTP amounts) by r, and defining an indicator variable Ir = 1 if 
response pattern r occurs, Ir = 0 otherwise, the likelihood function for the observed 
patterns of responses across the sample can be written succinctly as 
L = Σ r Ir ⋅  Probr. (17) 
6. Estimation 
To jointly estimate the parameters in equations (12), (13), and (15), the log of the 
likelihood function in (17) was maximized using the Maximum Likelihood Module     
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Version 4.0.26 of Gauss Version 3.2.32.  We removed 17 households from the sample 
that were identified as “protesters,” resulting in a final sample of 148. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables that provide the foundation for creating the 
regressors of the model.  The Deterrent Effectiveness variables represent the deterrent 
qualities of the electric fence that varied across households.  The effectiveness was 
specified for each of the four animal types as a 25, 50, 75, or 100 percent reduction in the 
number of animal attacks experienced by the household relative to the previous year.  
Other variables represented the number of attacks of each animal type experienced per 
household during the past year.  The number of attacks ranged widely, e.g., an average of 
only 0.88 predator incidents per household to 67.72 livestock incidents.  The interactions 
between the animal attack variables and the deterrent effectiveness variables yield 
estimates of the reductions achieved in the numbers of animals attacking.  
Table 1 describes additional potential determinants of WTP, including the area of a 
household’s cropland, which averages over 10 hectares; the number of cattle it owns, 
which averages 18.59 head; and the number of cattle in an entire village, which is nearly 
500 head. A dummy variable was introduced for the village of Muyako, as it is 
structurally different from the other villages in the sample.  The average household in 
Muyako owns significantly more cattle, has larger fields, produces more maize, has a 
higher cash income, and is generally better off (Sutton, 2001).   
7. Results 
Table 2 provides the bivariate probit results for a model that jointly estimates the 
parameters for WTP in cash and/or maize and the shadow value of maize.  Numerous     
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forms of the WTP and shadow value functions were estimated in an effort to take full 
advantage of the rich survey data collected on farm households in Caprivi and to explain 
the sources of variation in WTP.  Cross effects between the numbers of different animal 
types deterred as indicated in (14) were estimated.  Measures of the importance of 
different agricultural activities to the household—such as the value of their livestock, the 
total numbers of their livestock, the total value of their annual harvest, and the size of 
their fields—were examined.  Agricultural practices, such as the start date of cultivation, 
were included.  The Muyako dummy was also interacted with variables such as the 
number of each animal type deterred by the program. Various estimates of the full money 
and maize budgets were included, including money income and the value of maize 
harvests.  These did not prove to be very good predictors of WTP, possibly because 
incomes and harvests are not well measured or accurately reported.  
A number of variables were also created from Geographic Information System (GIS) 
data, including measures of the local elephant population, farming potential, conservation 
potential, distance from the nearest conservation area and percentage of cultivated area 
(see Mendelsohn and Roberts, 1997).  These variables were interacted with the animals-
deterred variables as indicated by (14).  They became insignificant as other, more 
powerful determinants of WTP were added, probably because the GIS variables were 
village-level aggregates, unlike the household-level data we collected. 
In addition to a constant, dummy variables for other characteristics hypothesized to 
affect the value households placed on maize were included in the shadow value function.  
Among these were indicators of whether the household sold any maize during the past 
year, whether the household was estimated to be in a grain production deficit, and     
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whether the household was located in Muyako.  Several combinations of these status 
indicators were also employed (e.g., located in Muyako and a grain seller).   
The model presented in Table 2 was the most effective in explaining jointly the WTP 
money and maize and the shadow value of maize. The model is highly significant as 
measured by the total log-likelihood, resulting in a likelihood ratio test statistic of 174.77 
and a pseudo-R
2 of 0.305.  The number of elephants deterred is significant at the 3% 
level, with a Student’s-t statistic of 1.88.  All of the other explanatory variables—the 
number of predators deterred, the cross effects between the number of predators and 
livestock deterred, the cross effects between the number of herbivores deterred and the 
household’s field size, the cross effects between the number of predators deterred and the 
size of the household’s cattle herd, the cross effects between the number of livestock 
deterred and the size of the village cattle herd, and the interaction between the Muyako 
dummy variable and the number of livestock deterred—are significant at the 1% level, 
with t-statistics of 2.37 or greater in absolute values, as reported in Table 2.  The shadow 
value of maize and the dispersion and correlation parameters are also highly significant.  
The shadow value has a t-statistic of 4.85, the standard errors of money and maize have t-
statistics of 10.62 and 9.84, respectively, and the correlation ρ  has a t-statistic of 9.58 (all 
resulting in P-values of zero). The estimated model offers a great improvement over a 
naïve model using only the dispersion and correlation parameters. 
The herbivores deterred/field size cross effects variable indicates that households with 
larger areas under cultivation are willing to pay more to deter herbivores.  The predators 
deterred/household cattle cross effects variable suggests that households with larger cattle 
herds are willing to pay more to deter predators from attacking.  The livestock     
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deterred/village cattle cross effects variable indicates that in villages with larger cattle 
populations, households are willing to pay more for a deterrent to livestock attacks. The 
Muyako/livestock deterred interaction variable implies that Muyako households are 
willing to pay more to deter livestock attacks. All of these results seem reasonable and 
intuitive. The elephants deterred variable is significant and has a positive influence on 
WTP. It was not significant when interacted with other variables. 
The estimated correlation parameter ρ  is 0.74, representing a high degree of 
correlation between the error terms.  Hypothesis testing reveals that ρ  is highly 
significantly different from zero and from one.  This result supports the use of a bivariate 
model to estimate WTP across the two currencies instead of the univariate “double-
bounded” model, which implicitly assumes that ρ  = 1.  The correlation is lower than the ρ  
of 0.95 that Cameron and Quiggin found in their 1994 study, making it more likely, 
according to Alberini (1995), that parameter estimates would be biased if a bivariate 
model were not used. 
Ultimately, the shadow value of maize υ (·) was estimated as a constant; the other 
variables used in this expression became insignificant as the variation in WTP became 
better explained.  The estimated shadow value of N$0.31/kg of maize was highly 
significant and significantly different from the reported 1998 mill-door purchase price for 
maize in the regional capital (N$0.86/kg, Jurgen Hoffmann, Namibian Agronomic Board, 
pers. comm.).  Farmers’ shadow values should be lower than the mill-door price because 
of transportation and other transaction costs involved in getting the maize to the mill,     
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though the magnitude of the difference (2.8 times) is unusually high.  It suggests the 
presence of important imperfections in the rural Caprivi maize market.   
The remoteness of communities in the Caprivi reduces their level of information 
about changing end-use prices, and increases the cost of getting crops to market.  It also 
reduces their bargaining power with the few traders commercializing low volumes.  
Storage costs are high, and there are also losses of stock during storage and transport.  
Each of these helps explain the significant difference between household shadow values 
and market prices for maize. 
This difference demonstrates the potential for error in the conventional approach to 
CVM in developing countries, which is to simply multiply households’ WTP in the non-
market currency (maize in this application) by the market price in order to determine their 
WTP money.  It reinforces impressions obtained during field research that Caprivi 
households are not fully integrated into the market economy and underscores the 
importance of identifying the shadow values of non-monetary goods when they are used 
to measure WTP because they are more familiar to respondents.
5 
8. Willingness to Pay Estimates 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of a reduction of one attack by each animal type 
deterred on WTP in cash and in maize.  These values are the derivative of the WTP with 
respect to an animal type deterred, evaluated at each household’s actual level of attacks     
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and averaged across the sample.  The mean household WTP to deter one predator from 
attacking one time is N$150.60 in cash or 343.89 kg in maize (at the time of the survey, 
US$1 = N$5.80).  Surprisingly, the mean WTP to deter one elephant attack is only 
N$0.91 or 2.09 kg of maize. The WTP to deter attacks by one livestock or one wild 
herbivore falls in-between, at N$77.59 and N$17.59 respectively. At the margin, given 
the level of attacks experienced from each animal type during the previous year, 
households were most concerned about deterring an attack from an additional predator.  
This makes sense, since there are relatively few predators and they tend to attack as 
individuals or in small groups, yet are capable of destroying a Caprivi farm household’s 
most valuable non-human asset—its cattle.  The average household appears to place 
substantially less value on deterring the attack of an additional elephant. Table 3 also 
shows the WTP to deter an attack as a share of the household’s total income. Since these 
measures reflect the cost of only one animal attacking one time, the shares of mean 
income are generally low.  However, the WTP to deter a single predator attack equals 
over 2% of mean annual income.  
Table 4 provides estimates of the annual household WTP in money and in maize for a 
100% reduction in each type of animal attack, holding constant the levels of the other 
three types of animal attacks.  These estimates show the total annual cost of damage 
incurred from each of the four animal types. That is, while Table 3 provides information 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 The cause of the low shadow value could also be that farmers want the fence, but cannot afford to pay 
much in money because they cannot readily convert maize into cash and then pay the government.  It could 
be that they fear accumulating large amounts of cash, which could be stolen, or that others might pressure 
them to use that cash for purposes other than the purchase of the fence.     
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on households’ WTP for a marginal reduction in attacks, Table 4 shows the more relevant 
information for policy-making, which is the effect on WTP of eliminating animal attacks.  
The relative importance of each type of animal changes when its total, rather than its 
marginal effect, is considered.  Strikingly, the mean WTP money for a 100% reduction in 
livestock attacks, at N$1,289.44 or 2,944.36 kg of maize per year, is much higher than for 
any of the other animal types, largely because of their high frequency of occurrence.  
Other wild herbivores have the second highest mean total effect at N$194.04, while 
predators are third at N$185.86.  The mean WTP for a 100% reduction in elephant 
attacks is again lowest, at N$32.81.  The WTP for complete elimination of all animal 
attacks is 24% of annual household income, with wildlife accounting for 6% and 
livestock attacks for 18%.  The 6% figure is an estimate of the cost borne by villagers 
from living with wildlife and thus provides a quantitative dimension to the anecdotal 
evidence supplied by villagers in discussions and interviews.  
9. Conclusions 
This paper presents estimates of the costs of living with wildlife suffered by villagers 
in a rural pastoral economy, developed through a novel extension to the village setting of 
the widely-used contingent valuation stated preference methodology.  Compared to past 
approaches to measuring wildlife damage costs, this one is relatively simple and fast to 
implement, requiring only single visits to a sample of households.  Its conceptual 
underpinnings and application represent several “firsts” in the literatures on assessing 
damage costs and on household shadow pricing in development economics.  It is the first 
study to use contingent valuation methods to measure the costs to local communities of     
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living with wildlife.  It presents the first use of a utility-theoretic approach to joint 
estimation of a household’s WTP for a non-market good or government program in both 
cash and a non-monetary numeraire good, along with the shadow value for the non-
monetary numeraire.  The strategy pays a double bonus because the shadow value of the 
non-monetary numeraire—in this case, maize—is interesting in its own right.  Household 
shadow pricing is an important issue in settings where markets are imperfect and prevent 
the use of market prices to assess household welfare impacts. 
The WTP measures are Hicksian compensating variation measures of farmers’ 
welfare that encompass the major costs to farmers of living with wildlife, including the 
opportunity costs of changes in production practices caused by the threat of animal 
attacks, which no one has measured using the “physical” damage techniques.  As the 
results are representative, they can be used to estimate the total cost of wildlife damage 
for the entire region (see Sutton, 2001). The joint WTP-shadow value approach could be 
used to value nearly any non-market good or public program.  
The empirical results demonstrate that rural Caprivi farmers incur significant costs 
from living with elephants and other types of wildlife.  The marginal WTP measures 
reveal that households are most concerned about preventing individual attacks by 
predators, and then by other herbivores, though elephants are typically cited as the 
greatest problem. It is possible that undue attention is given to the damages caused by the 
large, charismatic animal relative to those caused by other less obvious herbivores or 
predators.  Other studies have focused on communities where elephant damage is acute.  
Because our sample was randomly selected, it also includes communities farther from 
elephant habitat.  Since smaller wildlife species are often widely dispersed, they could     
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still cause damage to households in those communities.  The discrete WTP results also 
indicate that livestock generate high total costs to farmers by eating their crops. There is 
typically no mention of livestock damages. We included livestock in the analysis in 
recognition that fences would protect crops from marauding livestock as well as wildlife. 
Had we not done so, the results would have been seriously biased.  It is not clear how 
widespread is this problem with livestock damage, but in the Caprivi Region the lack of 
property rights enforcement appears to be an important cause.  
Several policy implications can be drawn from this analysis.  First, Caprivi farm 
households incur significant costs from wildlife attacks, while research has shown that 
they receive few benefits from the presence of wildlife (Sutton, 2001).  In contrast, since 
wildlife is the main tourist attraction in Namibia, the tourism industry, e.g., tour 
operators, lodges, restaurants, and car rental companies, and the government (tax 
revenues) gain greatly.  For reasons of efficiency and equity, mechanisms should be 
developed to compensate Caprivi farmers for damages incurred from wildlife.  Without 
such mechanisms, incentives are distorted since Caprivi farmers have motivation to kill 
wildlife and convert wildlife habitat, rather than preserve them, even though both are of 
national and global value.  Similarly, income distribution is worsened.  Farmers—who 
are predominantly poor, black and rural—bear the costs of living with wildlife while 
others—who are predominantly white, urban and often foreign—gain the benefits.  
Because wildlife contribute public as well as private benefits, funds for compensation 
could come from government, including the Namibian Government’s Game Products 
Trust Fund, which generates money from the sale of stockpiled ivory and other wildlife 
products, as well as from the tourism industry and from national and international     
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conservation organizations.  The Game Products Trust Fund is currently allowed to fund 
community-level investments, but not to pay compensation to individual farmers 
(Barnard, 2002).  Further work is warranted to evaluate policies such as the establishment 
of community wildlife conservancies that may provide direct benefits to villagers (e.g., 
Barnes et al., 2001), and to determine how their scope and effectiveness may be 
increased.  Given the WTP estimates generated here, it is unlikely that most Caprivi 
households could justify an electric fence, whose unsubsidized cost is about N$8.60/m 
(Pricewaterhouse, 1998).  However, they have been shown to be effective against wildlife 
in trials, and a subsidy could be warranted on the grounds stated above. 
Second, the results point to the importance of controlling livestock—i.e., reducing 
livestock crop damage—to improve the welfare of rural Caprivians. An important step in 
controlling livestock would be to develop well-defined property rights regarding where 
livestock can graze and who is responsible for damages caused when livestock graze 
elsewhere (Jarvis, 1984).  Barbed-wire fencing of crops is more economical than electric, 
but might be destroyed by wildlife, e.g., elephants (see Sutton, 2001). 
Third, to reduce the costs of wildlife attacks at the margin, priority should be given to 
developing methods to deter predator attacks.  Farmers’ responses indicate that predator 
attacks are costly, whether this is from damage to livestock or psychological costs to 
humans.  
The damages from wildlife-human interactions estimated in this study are moderate 
relative to average farmer incomes, though not necessarily to the incomes of individual 
farmers.  The damages are very small relative to the gains that wildlife create for Namibia     
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and the world.  Thus, our results call attention to the need to manage wildlife in a manner 
that optimizes social utility by exploiting benefits, reducing damages and rectifying 
inappropriate societal transfers.  Over time, this issue will become increasingly important.  
There is vast potential for development of wildlife tourism in this region of Namibia, 
particularly as it provides a link for tourists seeking a variety of wildlife experiences such 
as those available in other parts of Namibia as well as in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa.  However, as Namibia develops economically, farming in this region should 
become increasingly intensive.  Any agricultural development will result in significantly 
larger wildlife-human interactions of the type studied here.  There is clearly need for 
additional study of how best to manage wildlife, but increased payments to farmers and 
residents in the region are an important place to begin.       
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample (n = 148)
6 








Percent Reduction  0.62  0.29  0.25  1.0 
Herbivore Deterrent 
Effectiveness 
Percent Reduction  0.61  0.28  0.25  1.0 
Predator Deterrent 
Effectiveness 
Percent Reduction  0.65  0.28  0.25  1.0 
Livestock Deterrent 
Effectiveness 
Percent Reduction  0.64  0.28  0.25  1.0 
Elephant Attacks  Animals/HH/Year  13.84  29.80  0.0  170.0 
Herbivore Attacks  Animals/HH/Year  20.66  72.56  0.0  540.0 
Predator Attacks  Animals/HH/Year  0.88  1.80  0.0  16.0 
Livestock Attacks  Animals/HH/Year  67.72  95.63  0.0  800.0 
Muyako Dummy  (0 = no, 1 = yes)  0.19  0.39  0.0  1.0 
Field Size  Hectares/HH  10.16  10.07  1.0  100.0 
Household Cattle  Head/HH  18.59  27.87  0.0  210.0 
Village Cattle  Head/Village  493.68  317.62  188.0  1041.0 
 
                                                 
6 Because the survey was “two-and-a-half bounded”, the sample size is effectively larger.     
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Willingness to Pay:    
Elephants Deterred  2.6228  1.883 
Herbivores Deterred  .  . 
Predators Deterred  3.4321  3.602 
Livestock Deterred  .  . 
Predator/Livestock Deter. Cross Effects  -5.6814  -4.942 
Herbivore Deter./Field Size Cross Effects  4.9754  4.202 
Predator Deter./HH Cattle Cross Effects  7.9763  2.875 
Livestock Deter./Vill. Cattle Cross Effects  2.6007  3.627 
Muyako/Livestock Deter. Interaction  3.1588  2.365 
Shadow Value of Maize:    
Constant 0.3070  4.849 
Dispersion and Correlation:    
σ
m  1.5796 10.621 
σ
s  1.3359 9.842 
ρ   0.7426 9.580 
Pseudo-R
2  0.305 
Total log-L of this Model  -198.68748 
Total log-L of Naïve Model (γ =β =0)  -286.07098 
χ
2 (d.f.)  174.77 (8) 
n 148 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects on Household WTP Money and Maize of One Animal 






Willingness to Pay Money (N$): 
  
Elephant 0.91  0.01% 
Other Herbivore  17.59  0.24% 
Predator 150.60  2.13% 
Livestock 77.59  1.10% 
Willingness to Pay Maize (kg): 
  
Elephant 2.09  0.01% 
Other Herbivore  40.17  0.24% 
Predator 343.89  2.13% 
Livestock 177.18  1.10% 
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Table 4: Discrete Effects on Annual Household WTP Money and Maize of a 100% 






Willingness to Pay Money (N$): 
  
Elephants 32.81  0.5% 
Other Herbivores  194.04  2.7% 
Predators 185.86  2.6% 
Livestock 1,289.44  18.2% 
Willingness to Pay Maize (kg): 
  
Elephants 74.92  0.5% 
Other Herbivores  443.07  2.7% 
Predators 424.39  2.6% 
Livestock 2,944.36  18.2% 
 
 
 
 